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Abstract: Epistemological disjunctivism says that one can know that p on the rational basis of 
one’s seeing that p. The basis problem for disjunctivism says that that can’t be since seeing that 
p entails knowing that p on account of simply being the way in which one knows that p. In 
defense of their view disjunctivists have rejected the idea that seeing that p is just a way of 
knowing that p (the SwK thesis). That manoeuvre is familiar. In this paper I explore the 
prospects for rejecting instead the thought that if the SwK thesis is true then seeing that p can’t 
be one’s rational basis for perceptual knowledge. I explore two strategies. The first situates 
disjunctivism within the context of a ‘knowledge-first’ approach that seeks to reverse the 
traditional understanding of the relationship between perceptual knowledge and justification (or 
rational support). But I argue that a more interesting strategy situates disjunctivism within a 
context that accepts a more nuanced understanding of perceptual beliefs. The proposal that I 
introduce reimagines disjunctivism in light of a bifurcated conception of perceptual knowledge 
that would see it cleaved along two dimensions. On the picture that results perceptual 
knowledge at the judgemental level is rationally supported by perceptual knowledge at the 
merely functional or ‘animal’ level. This supports a form of disjunctivism that I think is 
currently off the radar: one that’s consistent both with the SwK thesis and a commitment to a 
traditional reductive account of perceptual knowledge. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
According to one version of epistemological disjunctivism, you can enjoy rational support for 
your perceptual beliefs on the basis of your seeing that p to be the case. Since seeing that p 
entails p, this provides you with a kind of factive rational support that you would not have 
unless p were true. But doesn’t seeing that p also entail knowing that p? It can seem very natural 
to think so, on account of its just being a way of knowing that p.1 But if that is right then it 
seems that we can motivate this argument for thinking that disjunctivism is false: 
 
 The Basis Argument against Disjunctivism  
 
1) Seeing that p is just a way of knowing that p. (SwK thesis)2 
2) If seeing that p is just a way of knowing that p, then seeing that p cannot serve as one’s 
rational basis for knowing that p. 
3) Therefore, seeing that p cannot be one’s rational basis for knowing that p.  
 
This argument expresses what Duncan Pritchard calls ‘the basis problem’ for disjunctivism 
(Pritchard 2011, 2012, 2016).3 It’s standard for disjunctivists to shy away from (2) and reject (1), 
or the SwK thesis. Contrary to what we might have thought at first seeing that p cannot simply 
be the way in which one knows that p, since seeing that p doesn’t entail believing that p.4 That 
response is familiar. What remains unclear is what the prospects are for a version of 
disjunctivism that rejects (2) instead. There are good reasons for investigating those prospects.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In what sense here is seeing that p a way of knowing that p? Not in Cassam’s sense (2009). For in that sense a way 
of knowing is simply a means of acquiring knowledge about something, and a means of knowing needn’t entail 
knowledge (e.g. reading that p doesn’t entail knowing that p). Rather I think what we mean here is something like 
seeing that p is identical to a piece of propositional knowledge, or realizes propositional knowledge. More on this 
below. See French (2014) for discussion.   
2 Cf. Ghijsen 2015 
3 Note that there are ways of formulating ED that aren’t susceptible to the basis problem. These are formulations 
on which the rational support at issue isn’t characterized in terms of your seeing that p to be the case. See, e.g., 
French (2016) and Haddock (2011). 
4 See Pritchard (2012) (2016) and McDowell (2002b) for this line of response. They try to motivate a rejection of 
the WK thesis by describing cases that suggest that it’s not obvious that this thesis is supported by our ordinary 
thought and talk about epistemic seeing. For example, suppose you see a zebra in clear view but suspend judgment 
on whether there’s a zebra since you have a misleading defeater to the effect that it’s a cleverly disguised mule. 
Pritchard and McDowell register the intuition that, after the fact, it’d be perfectly natural for you to describe 
yourself as having seen that there was a zebra, despite your not knowing that there was since you didn’t believe that 
there was a zebra at the time. 
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 First Ghijsen (2015) argues that we have good reason to be suspicious of Pritchard’s 
(2012) case against the SwK thesis. Whatever the merits of those arguments, we should like to 
have a sense of how else a disjunctivist might get around the basis problem if not by trying to 
motivate a rejection of the SwK thesis. Second, many find the idea that seeing that p entails 
knowing that p on account of simply being the way in which one knows that p highly intuitive 
anyway, or at least very natural to assume (cf. Williamson 2000; Stroud 2009; Cassam 2007; 
Dretske 1969).5 If it were possible to defend disjunctivism against the basis problem without 
having to compromise on that idea, that would be a nice result for those interested in pursuing a 
disjunctivist approach to the rational support available for perceptual knowledge. 
 In this paper I explore two proposals for a defense of disjunctivism against the basis 
argument that leave the SwK thesis entirely intact. The first situates the disjunctivist’s proposal 
within the context of a ‘knowledge-first’ approach to the relationship between perceptual 
knowledge and factive rational support for perceptual beliefs.6 That puts the disjunctivist in 
position to reject premise (2) on the basis of its wrongly assuming that we’re advancing 
disjunctivism in service of a reductive account of perceptual knowledge. While this strategy is 
no doubt suitable for knowledge-firsters, it won’t work for those like Pritchard who wish to 
advance disjunctivism in service of an account that reduces perceptual knowledge to a kind of 
rationally supported perceptual belief. To that end I explore a different proposal. If we situate 
ED within a context that accepts Ernest Sosa’s (2015) distinction between ‘intentional’ and 
‘merely functional’ modes of belief, we can reject (2) on the basis of its wrongly assuming a 
univocal conception of perceptual knowledge. What that means will become clearer in due 
course. 
 Ultimately I hope to articulate the beginnings of a form of epistemological disjunctivism 
that I think is currently off the radar: one that’s consistent both with the SwK thesis and a 
commitment to offering an account of perceptual knowledge that reduces it to a kind of 
rationally supported perceptual belief. 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 For further arguments for the entailment thesis, see French (2012) and Ranalli (2014). For a case against the 
entailment thesis see Turri (2010). 
6 By ‘knowledge-first’ I invoke the orientation in epistemology that most associate with the vision of Tim 
Williamson (2000). 
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§1 
A ‘KNOWLEDGE-FIRST’ SOLUTION TO THE BASIS PROBLEM 
 
1.1 Disjunctivism and the Basis Problem 
 
I should begin by reviewing the core of epistemological disjunctivism and the basis problem 
that’s meant to make trouble for it. As Pritchard (2012) (2016) defends epistemological 
disjunctivism, it is a view about the rational support available for perceptual knowledge. In 
particular, in paradigmatic cases you enjoy rational support for your perceptual knowledge 
comprised of your seeing that p to be the case, where this is both factive and reflectively 
accessible to the subject. In this way seeing that p can be the rational basis for perceptual 
knowledge. 
 Pritchard claims that disjunctivism enjoys the advantage of accommodating both 
‘externalist’ and ‘internalist’ insights in epistemology with regard to perceptual knowledge. For 
insofar as your seeing that p is reflectively accessible, we secure what internalists often complain 
is missing from externalist theories—viz., that when one knows something there ought to be 
good reasons that are the subject’s reasons for adopting the relevant perceptual belief. But since 
seeing that p is also factive, so that it entails that p, we also secure what externalists often 
complain is missing from internalist theories—viz., a sufficiently tight connection between one’s 
epistemic support and the fact known.7 8 Among the view’s problems is the basis problem: 
Seeing that p can’t serve as the rational basis for one’s perceptual knowledge if seeing that p just 
entails knowing that p on account of simply being the way in which one knows that p.9  
 But why is that? How exactly does the SwK thesis make trouble for the idea that seeing 
that p might serve as the rational basis for a bit of perceptual knowledge, so that premise (2) in 
the above argument can seem compelling?  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 It’s in this connection that Pritchard writes that epistemological disjunctivism represents the ‘holy grail’ of 
epistemology (2012, p.1). 
8 For criticism that ED doesn’t capture the internalist’s insight, see Boult (forthcoming), Madison (2014), and 
Goldberg (forthcoming). For criticism that there’s no internalist insight for ED to capture, see Littlejohn (2015) 
(forthcoming). For criticism that ED doesn’t capture the externalist’s insight, see Kelp and Ghijsen (2016).  
9 ED is susceptible to other problems, too: what Pritchard (2012) (2016) calls the access and distinguishability 
problems. There’s also the problem of explaining why, given that one enjoys factive and reflectively accessible 
rational support for perceptual beliefs, it seems impermissible to assert that you know what you do in contexts 
where sceptical error possibilities have been raised. I don’t speak to these other problems in this paper. 
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 Well imagine that the SwK thesis is true so that seeing that p entails knowing that p on 
account of being the way in which you know that p. In what sense then is seeing that p the way 
in which you know that p? Well that’s not merely to say that seeing that p is the means by 
which you know that p. After all x could be the means by which you know something even if x 
does not entail that you know it. For example reading that p could be the means by which you 
know that p, and yet you can read that p without coming to know anything at all (cf. Cassam 
2009). So if seeing that p is the way in which you know that p so that it entails that you know 
that p, seeing that p isn’t merely the means by which you know that p. Rather I think that what 
we want to say is that seeing that p is identical to an item of propositional knowledge, or at least 
the specific “realization base” of an item of propositional knowledge (cf. French 2014 
commenting on Williamson 2000). But then if that is the case then your putative rational basis 
for perceptual knowledge—your seeing that p—seems to ‘presuppose’ the very knowledge in 
question in a way that makes it look as though perceptual knowledge is epistemically supporting 
itself! (Ghijsen 2015).10 Many will strain to see how this is an even remotely illuminating 
account of everyday perceptual knowledge. 
 
1.2 The ‘Knowledge-First’ Strategy 
 
But perhaps this only seems like an unilluminating account because we are imagining that the 
disjunctivist is advancing their proposal in service of a traditional reductive account of 
perceptual knowledge. That is, an account that seeks to explicate the epistemic basis of 
perceptual knowledge in terms of factive rational support without referring to the perceptual 
knowledge at issue. If seeing that p entails knowing that p on account of just being the way in 
which you know that p (as discussed above), then seeing that p clearly seems ill-suited to serve 
as the epistemic basis of perceptual knowledge in an account like that. But what if we simply 
abandon that aspiration? What if instead we advance disjunctivism as an account of the rational 
support available for perceptual knowledge with no view towards reducing perceptual 
knowledge to a kind of rationally supported belief? In this way the disjunctivist might reject 
premise (2) by way of exposing that it rests on the false assumption that we are aiming for a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Pritchard (2016, p. 127) writes that at best it would look like “one can appeal to seeing that p to explain how one 
knows that p, but not to indicate one’s epistemic basis for knowing that p.” Ghijsen (2015, p. 1149) adds that “this 
would make the perceptual knowledge that p literally self-supporting (…)”. Thanks to a referee for helping me to 
be clarify exactly how SwK makes trouble for disjunctivism.  
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traditional reductive account of the epistemic basis of perceptual knowledge. But how exactly 
does a disjunctivism like this work?  
 Alan Millar (2010) (2011b) (2016), for example, defends just such a view. For him, 
perceptual beliefs are rationally supported (or ‘justified’) although not known on the rational 
basis of one’s seeing that p to be the case. In fact, Millar is explicit that it’s in part because one 
perceptually knows that p that one enjoys this factive rational support.11 Millar writes that his 
account: 
 
“(…) reverses the traditional philosophical order of explanation as between knowledge 
and justification in cases of perceptual knowledge (…). Possession of justification in these 
cases arises out of what we know about our environment and about our mode of 
perceptual access to it” (2011, p. 238). 
 
For Millar we explicate the epistemic basis of perceptual knowledge not in terms of a rational 
basis to believe anything, but in terms of exercising certain perceptual-recognitional abilities (cf. 
Millar 2008, 2009, 2010). These are abilities to come to non-inferentially know of things in 
your environment that they are of some kind from the way they look. And so if on some 
occasion you know by seeing that something before you is a tomato, that’s because you’ve 
exercised an ability to recognize tomatoes as tomatoes from the way they look—not because 
you’ve exploited some rational basis provided by your experience for thinking that it’s a tomato.  
 But if seeing that it’s a tomato is not the epistemic basis of your perceptual knowledge in 
this way, it might still function as the rational basis for your knowledge that it is a tomato.12 
How is that? Well on Millar’s view when you come to know that there is a tomato before you in 
response to a visual experience to this effect, you typically exercise not only an ability to tell of a 
tomato that it’s a tomato, but also a higher-order ability to tell that you have exercised that 
lower-order ability—that is, an ability to tell of a tomato that it is a tomato that you see (cf. 
Millar 2011a, 2011b, 2014, 2016) And so in response to the same visual experience, you 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Millar writes that “instead of explaining the knowledge as, so to speak, built up from justified belief, we treat the 
knowledge as what enables one to be justified in believing” (2010, p. 139). 
12 To clarify, by ‘epistemic basis’ I mean that in virtue of which one knows something. One’s ‘rational basis’ may be 
that in virtue of which one knows something, in which case it will also be one’s epistemic basis for that knowledge. 
But we should allow that one might enjoy a rational basis for their perceptual knowledge, despite one’s not 
knowing on the basis of this rational support. 
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typically come to recognize (and so know) not only that it’s a tomato, but also that you see that 
it is a tomato.  
 This sets the stage for your seeing that there is a tomato to serve as the rational basis for 
your knowing that it is a tomato. After all, at least absent any other information, you would 
ordinarily think that there was a tomato before you only so long as you thought you were seeing 
that there was a tomato, and were to you abandon this later belief you would abandon the 
former as well. It’s in virtue of sustaining your belief that there is a tomato in this way that your 
awareness of the fact that you see that there is a tomato serves as the rational basis for the bit of 
perceptual knowledge that, Millar is happy to allow, your seeing that there’s a tomato entails.13  
 Thus if we follow Millar in situating disjunctivism within the context of a ‘knowledge-
first’ approach, it seems we are afforded an easy way out of the basis argument for disjunctivism. 
There is no need to reject the SwK thesis. Premise (2) is false. It only seems plausible insofar as 
it rests on the false assumption that we are advancing disjunctivism in service of an account that 
reduces perceptual knowledge to a kind of rationally supported perceptual belief. (For only then 
do we have some idea of what the complaint here could be—what in particular is wrong about 
perceptual knowledge rationally supporting itself. That is, we are prohibited from explicating 
the epistemic basis of perceptual knowledge while making reference to the very perceptual 
knowledge in question.) But once we abandon that aspiration within the context of the 
‘knowledge-first’ approach it’s no longer clear what the problem is supposed to be—why 
perceptually knowing that p cannot furnish its own factive rational support.    
 That is all well and good for disjunctivists like Millar who are sympathetic to the 
knowledge-first approach. However, this sort of move is unavailable to disjunctivists like 
Pritchard who seek to advance a form of disjunctivism that’s more in step with philosophical 
tradition. So long as we advance the view within the context of a ‘reasons-first’ approach that 
seeks a reductive account of what perceptual knowledge is like, we’ll have to find some other 
way to dispel the impression that if seeing that p is just the way in which you know that p then 
disjunctivism is true only if perceptual knowledge is self-supporting in some vicious manner. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Compare Millar when he writes: “Since it is constitutive of seeing that there are tomatoes in the basket that I 
believe that there are, it cannot be that I come to believe that there are in response to being apprised of the fact 
that I see that there are. Rather, I am in a position such that the reason I have to believe plays a role in sustaining 
the belief: were a question to arise as to whether there are tomatoes in the basket I would be liable to resist any 
suggestion that there are not in view of the fact that I see that there are, and were I to cease to believe that I see 
that there are then, all else equal, I’d cease to believe that there are” (2011b, p. 332-33) (emphasis added). 
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 I think there is such a way. On a different approach, we situate disjunctivism not within 
the context of a ‘knowledge-first’ view, but within the context of a view of perceptual knowledge 
on the part of human beings that would see it cleaved along two dimensions. That is, into 
perceptual knowledge that’s a species of what Ernest Sosa (2015) calls ‘merely functional’ belief, 
and perceptual knowledge that’s a species of what he calls ‘judgmental belief’. I submit that by 
situating disjunctivism within the framework that Sosa provides, we can reject premise (2) on 
the basis of it’s wrongly assuming something different—viz., a univocal conception of 
perceptual knowledge.  
 First I’ll present the framework we find in Sosa. Then I’ll show how a disjunctivist might 
apply the framework to the desired effect.  
 
§2 
THE BIFURCATED CONCEPTION OF PERCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE 
 
In this section I’ll draw on recent work from Ernest Sosa (2015) to describe what I’ll call the 
bifurcated conception of perceptual knowledge on the part of mature human beings. I will then 
show how the disjunctivist might apply this conception for an interpretation of her view that is 
free of any conflict with the SwK thesis.  
 In Judgment and Agency (2015) Sosa writes that “we can distinguish between two sorts 
of ‘belief’, one implicit and merely functional, the other not merely functional, but intentional, 
perhaps even consciously intentional” (p. 80). He writes later that this distinction has “animal, 
action-guiding belief on one side, and the reflective judgments on the other” (p. 209). Sosa 
takes these to be different kinds of doxastic representation. How are they different from each 
other? 
 Sosa associates animal, action-guiding functional beliefs sometimes with “degrees of 
confidence”, sometimes with “seemings”, and sometimes with “credences”. They’re supposed to 
be “fully wired-in forms of representing” or “passive states that we cannot help entering” (p. 54) 
that are “acquired automatically” by way of “normal automatic processing” (p. 53).  
 By contrast, what Sosa calls “reflective, judgmental belief” (…) 
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“(…) is a disposition to judge affirmatively in answer to a question, in the endeavor to 
answer correctly (…), reliably enough or even aptly. And this “judgment” that one is 
supposed to render is a distinctive conscious act or consciously sustained state” (p. 209). 
 
Elsewhere Sosa adds that these judgmental beliefs are undergirded by a kind of “freely adopted 
evidential policy” with respect to a proposition, a policy residing in the will of the subject (p. 
210). That suggests that these judgmental attitudes or commitments are constitutively sensitive 
to a rational basis of some sort—to evidence or reasons for thinking them true. Let’s illustrate 
this using a concrete case. 
 Imagine you perceive a tomato on the table in the ‘good case’ where epistemic 
conditions are objectively and subjectively good. Your perceptual and cognitive equipment are 
in fine order, there is nothing particularly abnormal about your environment, and you have not 
been given any relevant defeaters. If we take Sosa’s view seriously that means that in response to 
what you see you form both judgmental and merely functional beliefs that it is a tomato before 
you. First, what exactly does it mean that you judgmentally believe this?  
 I take it that on Sosa’s account this means that in that moment, in light of the reasons 
you take yourself to have for thinking the proposition true, you sustain a perceptual evidential 
policy such that were you to consciously consider whether just now a tomato is before you, you 
would affirm this proposition to yourself in an effort to thereby affirm knowledgably.14 By 
sustaining that judgmental belief in that moment you reveal that you take your perceptual 
reasons to be good enough to warrant your affirming this proposition for the purpose of 
affirming knowledgeably, were you to take a moment and explicitly consider the matter.15 It 
might be helpful to contrast yourself with the Pyrrhonian sceptic, for example, who sustains a 
very different perceptual evidential policy. She is convinced that her perceptual reasons or 
evidence are never good enough for this kind of free judgmental affirmation—and so instead 
suspends on all such matters. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 In what follows I substitute ‘knowledgeably’ where Sosa would say ‘aptly’. I think this is a safe substitution that 
shouldn’t obscure my representation of Sosa’s ideas. This is merely to avoid having to address the technicalities of 
Sosa’s view of aptness with respect to belief, which would take us too far afield. Suffice it to say that, on Sosa’s 
view, an apt belief is not simply true and competently formed, but true because competently formed. See also Sosa 
(2016). 
15 This isn’t something I’m able to do, for instance, when merely guessing the answer to a question in a game show. 
Here I might affirm that, say, Columbus sailed in 1492 in effort to affirm truly (after all I want the prize, and you 
need true answers for that!). But I wouldn’t be affirming to thereby affirm knowledgably, on Sosa’s view. For him a 
truly judgmental belief isn’t manifested in an intentional truth-aimed affirmation that amounts to a mere guess. 
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 By contrast, the way in which you merely functionally believe that there is a tomato 
before you requires no such ability to freely and intentionally affirm the truth of this 
proposition—it requires nothing at all so sophisticated. In sometimes referring to it as ‘animal 
belief’ Sosa suggests that this is a kind of representational attitude that we share with animals 
and small children. These seem to be what Daniel Dennett conceives of as “deep, behaviour-
disposing states” that “one’s behaviour is consonant with automatically” (p. 307,308). They are 
the sort of minimal doxastic attitude even the Pyrrhonian relies on to guide her behaviour when 
she reaches for the tomato into order to make a sandwich. 
 In Sosa then we find contrasted two kinds of doxastic representational state. Merely 
functional beliefs are representational states we find ourselves more or less saddled with as a 
result of the functioning of sub-personal processes. These are the states that, together with 
desire, are operative in motivating us to behave independently of any more sophisticated 
judgmental belief on our part. This later sort of belief, by contrast, itself has the look of an 
intentional action. It is a state of the subject that is rooted in her sustaining some evidential 
policy: One that requires her to affirm or vouch for the truth of a proposition, upon explicitly 
considering whether it’s true, in light of what she takes to be good reasons for thinking the 
proposition true. 
 Doubtless there are many interesting questions and perhaps objections concerning how 
these different kinds of belief relate to one another in an individual. I’m afraid it would take us 
too far afield to entertain them just now. As I have been saying, my main concern is to discover 
whether one can employ Sosa’s framework for articulating a form of disjunctivism that is both 
consistent with the entailment thesis and of piece with the traditional reductive approach.16 
Now notice how this bifurcated conception of human belief naturally gives way to at least two 
species of perceptual knowledge.17 There is perceptual knowledge that is a species of merely 
functionally believing something. And there is perceptual knowledge that is a species of 
judgmentally believing something. Let’s call perceptual knowledge of the former kind 
functional perceptual knowledge, and perceptual knowledge of the latter kind judgmental 
perceptual knowledge. Call the package the bifurcated conception of perceptual knowledge.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 For other examples of authors that seem to distinguish between at least two kinds of belief, see Daniel Dennett 
(1978), Gendler (2008), and Stevenson (2002), who actually distinguishes up to six different conceptions of belief. 
See also Neman (1870) who distinguishes between ‘notional’ assent and ‘real’ assent, and Frede (1998) who 
distinguishes ‘having a view’ from ‘taking a position’ on a matter. 
17 This shouldn’t come as a surprise to anyone familiar with Sosa’s work. He’s long held to a distinction between 
so-called ‘animal’ and ‘reflective’ knowledge. 
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§3 
REVISTING THE BASIS PROBLEM 
 
With the bifurcated conception of perceptual knowledge now in tow, consider again the basis 
argument against disjunctivism: 
 
 The Basis Argument Against Disjunctivism 
 
1) Seeing that p is just a way of knowing that p. (SwK thesis) 
2) If seeing that p is just a way of knowing that p, then seeing that p cannot serve 
 as one’s rational basis for knowing that p. 
3) Therefore, seeing that p cannot be one’s rational basis for knowing that p. 
 
We noted above that premise (2) can seem compelling insofar as perceptual knowledge looks to 
be viciously self-supporting if the SwK thesis is true. But notice that if that doesn’t wrongly 
assume that we are aiming for a reductive account of perceptual knowledge, then it assumes that 
the kind of perceptual knowledge that seeing that p entails is the very kind that, at the same 
time, it is meant to rationally support. But now we are in position to expose that as a potentially 
false assumption. For if there is not one but two levels of perceptual knowledge of the same 
proposition in play, then there is room for a conception on which perceptual knowledge on one 
level rationally supports perceptual knowledge on another level. 
 For consider a picture on which it is specifically judgmental perceptual knowledge that is 
rationally supported by one’s seeing that p. That seems like a natural fit anyway, given that we 
have already seen that judgmental belief seems to constitutively involve a kind of rational 
support that is exploited when one consciously affirms or endorses the truth of a proposition 
upon explicit consideration. On the current picture, then, in paradigmatic cases you enjoy 
rational support for your perceptual judgmental knowledge on the basis of your seeing that p to 
be the case. 
 Now since we are exploring a strategy for defending disjunctivism against the basis 
problem that leaves the SwK thesis intact, we want to allow that seeing that p is just the way in 
which one knows that p. But now there’s a choice to make. In functioning to rationally support 
one’s judgmental perceptual knowledge, does seeing that p entail the very judgmental 
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perceptual knowledge at issue? Or does it rather entail perceptual knowledge of a kind that is on 
the lower level—perceptual knowledge that is a species of merely functional belief? I cannot see 
anything that prevents the obvious choice here: that seeing that p entails merely functional 
perceptual knowledge. On the picture that results, then, in paradigmatic cases we have 
something that entails merely functional perceptual knowledge rationally supporting 
judgmental perceptual knowledge. We have something that entails perceptual knowledge on 
one level rationally supporting perceptual knowledge on an entirely different level.  
 What is crucial about that is that nothing here looks to be viciously rationally supporting 
itself. Judgmental perceptual knowledge enjoys rational support on the basis of merely 
functional perceptual knowledge. And merely functional perceptual knowledge enjoys rational 
support on the basis of nothing at all, for all we need to say. In fact it seems perfectly natural 
that what you perceptually know at this merely functional ‘animal’ level you know not in virtue 
of any kind of reason that is your reason for believing what you do (but we are going to come 
back to this in the final section).  
 Moreover, note that none of this precludes advancing disjunctivism in service of a 
traditional reductive account of perceptual knowledge, one that explicates the epistemic basis of 
perceptual knowledge in terms of rational support without referring to the perceptual 
knowledge in question. After all, the target perceptual knowledge is a form of judgmental 
perceptual knowledge. And while its rational basis entails perceptual knowledge, this is 
perceptual knowledge at another order—that is, merely functional perceptual knowledge. Thus 
we have here the makings of a strategy for rejecting premise (2) of the basis argument that even 
disjunctivists like Pritchard could avail themselves of. For unlike Millar’s strategy it does not 
require that we part so drastically with tradition on this score. On our proposal we safeguard 
the idea that perceptual knowledge (i.e. judgmental perceptual knowledge) can be reduced to a 
kind of rationally supported perceptual belief.18 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 This is why our proposal is also preferable to a view that is like Millar’s, with the exception that is offers a 
reductive externalist account of perceptual knowledge. On such a view we have only one kind of perceptual 
knowledge that receives a reductive externalist analysis. But such knowledge is also susceptible of further rational 
support courtesy of one’s seeing that p to be the case. Whatever the merits of a view like this, it is not able to 
sustain what I’m assuming is the relevant advantage secured by our proposal—viz., that it’s consistent with the 
ambition of offering a certain reductive account of perceptual knowledge: one that reduces perceptual knowledge 
to a kind of rationally supported perceptual belief. I’m claiming that only a disjunctivism that integrates the 
bifurcated conception of perceptual knowledge is able to sustain that advantage without compromising on the SwK 
thesis. Thanks to a referee for the journal for encouraging me to make this clearer. 
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 This then paves the way for a rejection of premise (2), not on the grounds that it assumes 
that we are aiming for a traditional reductive account, but on the grounds that it assumes that 
we are operating with a univocal conception of perceptual knowledge. After all, that is false on a 
conception of disjunctivism that is advanced within the context of the bifurcated conception of 
perceptual knowledge. On that conception, judgmental perceptual knowledge is rationally 
supported by one’s seeing that p, and seeing that p entails knowledge that p, only knowledge 
that’s a species not of judgmental but merely functional perceptual belief. It’s no longer clear 
that there is anything to recommend premise (2) once we have made it clear that there are these 
two levels of perceptual knowledge in play. Once we have done that we remove the basis for the 
complaint that perceptual knowledge rationally supports itself in some vicious manner. 
 
§4 
RECONCILING OUR PROPOSAL WITH THE ORIGINAL MOTIVATIONS BEHIND 
EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM 
 
Very well. Our proposal then has judgmental perceptual knowledge that p enjoying factive 
rational support on the basis of something that is the way in which one merely functionally 
knows the proposition at issue. It remains to be seen though whether this rendition of 
epistemological disjunctivism can be reconciled with the original motivations for the view. In 
this final section I remove what might appear to be grounds for scepticism about that.  
 First, it is typical for epistemological disjunctivists to motivate their view by claiming 
that it captures both internalist and externalist insights with regard to perceptual knowledge. 
But isn’t our proposal now in conflict with that ambition, since it has allowed merely functional 
perceptual knowledge into the picture—knowledge of a kind that appears to be thoroughly 
externalist in nature? I don’t think so. For keep in mind that even if our proposal requires a kind 
of perceptual knowledge that is thoroughly externalist in this way, this is not the knowledge that 
it targets for a disjunctivist analysis. Rather the relevant target is judgmental perceptual 
knowledge. But then why shouldn’t it it suffice for capturing the original motivation at issue 
that our theory of judgmental perceptual knowledge accommodates what internalists complain 
is missing from typical externalist accounts (i.e. that one should need to have good reasons for 
what they know), and what externalists complain is missing from typical internalist accounts (i.e. 
a sufficiently tight connection between one’s epistemic support and the fact known)? And 
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doesn’t our account of judgmental perceptual knowledge accomplish just that? In other words it 
isn’t clear why our proposal cannot be seen to accommodate both internalist and externalist 
motivations unless it can be seen to accommodate these with respect to both merely functional 
and judgmental perceptual knowledge. For this reason I don’t see that our proposal is in any 
deep tension with the disjunctivist’s original aim of providing an account of perceptual 
knowledge of the world that accommodates core internalist and externalist insights in 
epistemology.19  
 Second, some disjunctivists seem to motivate disjunctivism about perceptual knowledge 
on the grounds that knowledge in general requires a kind of ‘internalist’ factive rational support 
(cf. McDowell 1995, 2011; Littlejohn forthcoming). But clearly we cannot avail ourselves of 
that line of motivation once we have allowed for a kind of merely functional perceptual 
knowledge that needn’t require ‘internalist’ rational support at all—much less factive rational 
support. I’ll say just two things about this.  
 First, it isn’t clear that our proposal need conflict with the thought that knowledge in 
general requires factive rational support. In the last section I only said that I think we are free to 
give merely functional perceptual knowledge a thoroughly externalist analysis, not that we are 
by any stretch compelled to. For all that needs to be said here, it may be that merely functional 
perceptual knowledge too requires factive rational support. Of course, we wouldn’t want to say 
that this rational support is made available in the form of one’s seeing that p to be the case, for 
that would generate a new kind of basis problem, and most likely multiply notions of ‘seeing 
that p’ well beyond necessity. But you might think instead that one’s rational support for merely 
functional perceptual knowledge is made available by the fact that p itself (cf. Schnee 2016). 
That is, when you merely functionally know that it’s a tomato before you, that it’s a tomato is 
your rational basis for merely functionally believing this. In that case we would have a 
disjunctivism about merely functional perceptual knowledge embedded within a disjunctivism 
about judgmental perceptual knowledge. I don’t claim to know of any arguments for thinking 
that that should be so. I only claim that that’s one way of pursuing the details, a way that is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Perhaps this is the thought behind the worry. Of course our proposal can’t claim for itself that it’s able to 
reconcile both internalist and externalist insights with respect to perceptual knowledge, so long as these are 
supposed to be insights into just any kind of perceptual knowledge whatsoever. Not if we allow merely functional 
perceptual knowledge to take a thoroughly externalist analysis (i.e. with no ‘internalist’ admixture). But then why 
think that? Why think that the externalist’s and internalist’s insights are real insights into just any kind of 
perceptual knowledge that there may be? Thanks to a referee for stimulating me to think about this some more.   
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consistent with the thought that perceptual knowledge in general requires factive rational 
support.   
 But in any case, secondly, I don’t think that you have to think that knowledge in general 
requires factive rational support in order to motivate disjunctivism about perceptual knowledge. 
For example, Duncan Pritchard (2012) (2016), who is as prominent a disjunctivist as any, 
considers disjunctivism to be amply motivated without the thought that knowledge in general 
requires factive rational support.20 After all, on his view, not only does disjunctivism represent a 
rapprochement between internalist and externalist insights regarding perceptual knowledge (as 
we reviewed above), but it also enables a unique ‘undercutting’ anti-sceptical solution to the 
underdetermination-based radical sceptical paradox (cf. 2016, p. 132-142). Moreover, it may be 
claimed that epistemological disjunctivism about some kind of perceptual knowledge is 
supported by our ordinary justificatory practises, wherein it would be very unnatural to defend a 
claim to perceptually know something by appealing to a kind of consideration you might have 
anyway, even if what you believed were false.21 I submit that an epistemological disjunctivism 
advanced within the context of the bifurcated conception of perceptual knowledge is no less 
susceptible of these additional lines of motivation than, say, Pritchard’s original account. Thus 
even if it turns out that our proposal conflicts with the thought that knowledge in general 




Perhaps we are used to thinking that so long as the SwK thesis is true seeing that p could not be 
the rational basis for perceptual knowledge, so that disjunctivists must therefore try to motivate 
a rejection of the SwK thesis. In this paper I set out to explore what the prospects are for a 
different route: one that avoids the basis problem without rejecting that thesis.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Indeed he thinks that it’s only in paradigmatic cases that one perceptually knows that p by virtue of enjoying 
factive and reflectively accessible rational support in the form of one’s seeing that p to be the case. He explicitly 
denies that all knowledge, and even all perceptual knowledge, requires reflectively accessible and factive reasons 
(2015, forthcoming).        
21 Compare Pritchard (2016, p. 134-35): “(…) suppose I tell my manager over the phone that a colleague of mine is 
at work today (thereby representing myself as perceptually knowing this to be the case), and she expresses 
scepticism about this (…). In response I might naturally say that I know that she’s at work today because I can see 
that she’s at work (…). Indeed, wouldn’t it be odd for me to respond in this case, given the situation as described, 
by offering nonfactive rational support, such as by saying that it seems to me as if she is at work (…)?”  
22 Thanks to a referee for the journal for encouraging me to think through the issues in this last section. 
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 This route scrutinizes premise (2) of the basis argument against disjunctivism: the 
thought that if the SwK is true then perceptual knowledge looks self-supporting in some 
problematic fashion. We saw that premise (2) can seem compelling only given one or another 
assumption: viz., either that the disjunctivist advances her proposal in service of a reductive 
account of the epistemic basis of perceptual knowledge, or else that the kind of perceptual 
knowledge seeing that p entails is of the very kind that it at the same time rationally supports. 
Interestingly, either one or both of those assumptions might be false, depending upon how the 
disjunctivist chooses to situate her proposal. If she situates her proposal within the context of a 
‘knowledge-first’ approach to the issues, the first assumption is false. If she situates her proposal 
in context of the bifurcated conception of perceptual knowledge, the second assumption is false.  
 A particularly interesting upshot of this discussion is that by employing the bifurcated 
conception of perceptual knowledge the disjunctivist can articulate her proposal in a way that is 
consistent both with the SwK thesis and a commitment to providing a reductive account of 
everyday perceptual knowledge in terms of rationally supported perceptual belief. That seems 
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  Thanks to Duncan Pritchard, Martin Smith, Aidan McGlynn, Adam Carter, Giada Fratantonio, Lukas 
Schwengerer, Matt Jope, and Michel Croce for discussion of relevant themes. And thanks especially to two referees 
for Synthese for detailed comments on earlier drafts of this paper.	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